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in the United States. The procedure, instituted as a mechanism to get
rid of "bad patents," allows any outside party, within nine months of
the patent grant date, to challenge the validity of a granted patent on
any ground under the patent law, including patentable subject matter,
provided that the petitioner can demonstrate that it is more likely
than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is
unpatentable, or if there is a showing that "the petition raises a novel
or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents." This
review and decision on novel or unsettled legal questions is done by a
trial-like proceeding before the newly-created Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, whose decisions are appealable to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This note uses a model developed by
positive political theory to argue that (1) the new post-grant review
proceeding gives the PTO a considerable amount of power to
determine what constitutes patentable subject matter; (2) the PTO's
power to determine what constitutes patentable subject matter may
not create long-term security in what patentable subject matter is; and
(3) that the best way to create security for long-term investment in
patent protection may be for the Court of Appeals to take a more
active, policymaking role in its review of PTAB decisions.
INTRODUCTION

Post-grant review is a new review procedure for granted patents
in the United States. The procedure, instituted as a mechanism to get
rid of "bad patents," allows any outside party to challenge the validity
of a granted patent within nine months of the patent grant date,
provided that the petitioner can demonstrate that "it is more likely
than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is
unpatentable," or if there is a showing that "the petition raises a novel
or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents." The
review and decision on novel or unsettled legal questions is done by a
trial-like proceeding before the newly'-created Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB), whose decisions are appealable to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Importantly, unlike the other post-grant procedures under the
jurisdiction of PTAB, including interpartesreview (IPR) and exparte
reexamination, post-grant review (PGR) permits the PTAB to review
a granted patent for validity under any grounds for patentability
under 35 U.S.C. § 282, including patentable subject matter, written
description, and enablement. IPR and ex parte reexamination only
review patent validity based on prior art and questions about claim
scope raised during litigation.
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Accordingly, the PTAB has been given the power to make
determinations on "novel or unsettled legal questions" regarding what
"patentable subject matter" is. This gives the PTO, and specifically
the PTAB, significant power in determining the future of patent law.
By law, patentable inventions must be new and useful, and either a
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof. Some authors have argued that this
novel power to decide what is patentable is concerning, as it permits
the PTO to significantly expand or shrink what can be patented.
This note is not concerned with the ethics or morality of what
the PTAB might or might not consider patentable. This note does not
consider whether the "outcomes" of various biotechnology inventions
are desirable or undesirable. Rather, this note questions whether this
new process can maintain the kind of institutional security that makes
Indeed, the purpose of a patent under the
patents desirable.
Constitution is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective.. . Discoveries.",2 The investment in making
scientific discoveries is secured by the exclusive right to profit from
the discovery for a period of time, as protected by law. This security
serves as a "carrot" by creating an incentive structure that entices
innovation with a reasonably secure belief that one can enjoy the
exclusive use of the idea for profit for a period of time. This
protection creates other ancillary benefits as well, including
investment in new businesses and job creation. This is especially
pertinent in today's knowledge-based, "idea economy."
Anyone that has ever baked cookies understands that an
unwieldy oven can dis-incentivize the desire to bake. It is well known
in the art that wild temperature fluctuations during the baking process
do not produce good cookies, let alone edible ones. One will only
make cookies if one can be reasonably certain that at the end of the
prescribed baking time the cookies will turn out reasonably edible.
To be sure, if a baker knows that an oven can be unruly, the baker
either won't make the cookies, or will bake them in a different oven.
This concept of security in long-term returns inducing investment is
true throughout our daily lives: we invest in our retirement accounts
and watch sporting events, for example. If we withdrew money from
our retirement accounts every time there was a downturn in the
market, the total potential return would be significantly diminished.
If we weren't reasonably sure that the rules of sporting events were to
be enforced fairly we wouldn't invest our time and money in watching
2 U.S. CONST. art. I,

8.
§ 8, cl.
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them.3 Like a reliable oven, patents and the legal system in which
they operate create the type of institutional security that incentivizes
investment in innovation.
The length of patent protection today is twenty years. Twenty
years can span up to five presidential terms. As history has shown,
views can change significantly during the course of these twenty years.
When an inventor makes an investment in a patent, the inventor
believes that the law governing that patent will remain the same for
the duration of the patent, and makes business decisions and
investments accordingly. For this reason, the new PGR mechanism
whereby PTAB can make decisions on novel legal questions regarding
patentable subject matter is concerning. The PTAB's decisions on
legal questions regarding novelty, obviousness, written description,
and enablement will be limited to the patent in question in the
dispute, i.e., whether the prior art renders the granted patent
unpatentable, or whether the invention is adequately enabled, or
whether the invention is sufficiently described. Novel § 101 subject
matter questions, however, can shrink or expand exactly what is
patentable. The new PGR procedure, accordingly, may create
considerable risk for those wishing to pursue patent protection, as
what is patentable could change considerably over the course of
twenty years, depending on the direction of the PTAB. This added
volatility could have a chilling effect on both innovation and
investment, as it adds risk to the calculation of whether to invest.
This note further argues that the federal judiciary may be the
best tool to create security in investing in patent protection in this
brave new world of post-grant review. As PTAB's decisions are
appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
Federal Circuit is tasked with ensuring that the PTO does not stray far
in its policymaking function. The Federal Circuit should be the "yin"
to the PTO's "yang." As a byproduct, patent law, specifically what
constitutes patentable subject matter, should not stray far from its
intended statutory purpose. A reasonable expectation that the law
will not stray from it statutorily intended purpose creates the type of
security that incentivizes investment in the first place. An inventor
under this scheme is, presumably, more secure in his belief that what
is patentable today will be patentable in twenty years, and is thus
incentivized to invent and obtain protection for the invention in order
to profit off of her investment. However, after several 9-0 Supreme
3 This author, a Buffalo Bills season ticket holder, continues to invest even
though a negative return is expected. A reasonably fairly refereed game is at least
expected.
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Court decisions overturning Federal Circuit decisions, there is an
underlying concern that the Federal Circuit has become too "propatent," and has stopped being a check on the PTO. Even though this
concern may not be accurate, the perception may have a chilling effect
on a party's decision to pursue patent protection.
This note uses a model developed by positive political theory,
which looks at government and institutional actors as "players" in a
game theory analysis to predict policy outcomes, to argue that (1) the
new post-grant review proceeding gives the PTO a considerable
amount of power to determine what constitutes patentable subject
matter; (2) the PTO's expanded power to determine what constitutes
patentable subject matter may not create long-term security in what
patentable subject matter is; and (3) the best way to create security for
long-term investment in patent protection is for the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit to take a more active, policymaking role in
their review of PTAB decisions, perhaps by expanding PTAB appeal
jurisdiction beyond the Federal Circuit.
I. POST-GRANT REVIEW UNDER AIA GIVES THE PTO
CONSIDERABLE POWER TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER.

The new post-grant review procedure under the new AIA gives
the PTO a considerable amount of power to determine what
constitutes patentable subject matter. First, this section discusses how
and why post-grant review was included in the AIA. Second, this
section discusses the post-grant review process in depth. Third, this
section discusses the new power of the patent and trademark office to
decide novel questions of law with respect to patentability.
A. The humble beginningsofpost-grantreview
4
Large numbers of low-quality patents hurt innovation. Validity
challenges are thus important and useful for achieving the patent
system's goal of promoting innovation by maintaining a "balance of
fostering favorable conditions for inventors ... while preserving the5
progress."
public's interest in a competitive market for further

4 Mark Consilvio & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, Unravelingthe U.S.P.T.O.'sTangled
Web: An Empirical Analysis of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent
Proceedings, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 39 (2013); see also Lecture: Innovation,

Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law Reform: Should Congress Fix the Patent
Office andLeave Litigation Managementto the Courts?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.

MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1140-41 (2010).
5 Eric B. Cheng, Alternatives to District Court Patent Litigation: Reform by
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Congress, in creating a public mechanism to challenge bad patents and
rid the patent office of bad patents, sought to "create certainty for
6
patentees, their competitors, and society in general."
Europe has long challenged the validity of issued patents with
opposition proceedings.7 In general, an opposition proceeding lets a
third party bring an action before the European Patent Office
("EPO") within the first nine months of a patent grant.8 The
opposition proceedings, importantly, give the public an opportunity to
"assert knowledge, acts, and other disclosures" missing from the
9
PTO's original examination process.
Challenges to patent validity in the United States have
traditionally been handled in federal court, however, over time,
Congress added procedures allowing third parties to petition the PTO
to review issued patents.' 0 These procedures included interference
proceedings addressing issues of patentability; protests in reissue
proceedings; and ex parte and inter partes reexaminations, which
allowed third parties to petition for the reexamination of patents."
2
Unfortunately, these proceedings were limited in their scope.1
Interferences occurred only when a priority issue arose between two
similar patents, protests during reissue proceedings were rare and had
limited third party involvement, ex parte and inter partes
reexamination were both limited to challenges based on prior art, and
third parties in these challenges could not "conduct discovery, develop
evidence, or cross-examine a patent owner outside the interference
context."13
Enter post-grant review (PGR), which was borne largely out of
criticism the PTO received for granting patents to inventions that
might be underserving of protection. 4 According to Congress, the
Enhancing the Existing AdministrativeOptions, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2010).
6 Id. at 1139.
7 Id. at 1143-46.
8 Id.
9 Id. (Some counties in the EPC, such as Germany, have their own opposition
proceedings that precede the existence of the EPC opposition proceedings to
challenge the validity of nation-specific patents); see, e.g., N. Thane Bauz,
ReanimatingU.S. PatentReexamination:Recommendations for ChangeBased Upon
A ComparativeStudy of GermanLaw, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945 (1994) (For a more
in-depth look at the history of patent law).
10 Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review of
Patents,UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2013, 1, 3-8.
11 Id.
12

13
14

Id.
Id.

Id.; see also John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent
System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 328-30 (2001)
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America Invents Act1 5 (AIA) was "designed to establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent6
quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs'
because "patents of dubious probity only invite legal challenges that
divert money and other resources from more productive purposes...
venture capital, commercializing inventions, and
such as raising
17
creating jobs.,
The PTO submitted a 2 1st Century Strategic Planto Congress in
June of 2002.18 This report included thirty-seven "action initiatives
comprising the five-year strategic plan."' 19 In this report is perhaps the
first concrete example of the PTO's desire to progress towards a
system of post-grant review.20 In one of the action papers in the
report, entitled "Post-Grant Review of Patent Claims," it was argued
that a system of post-grant review would "enhance the patent system
as a whole" by strengthening those patents that survive the review and
eliminating those that do not.21 Soon thereafter, in 2002, the Federal
Trade Commission also recommended "an administrative procedure
for post-grant review and opposition that allows for meaningful
challenges to patent validity short of federal court litigation., 22 Two
years later, in 2004, the National Research Council of the National
Academies argued a similar position.23 Further, the International
(Professors Janis, Nard, and Amazon CEO have been calling for opposition
proceedings since the late 1990s). But see Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Stephanie Adamany,
Sandra Haberny & Jason Sheasby, Patent Reform Should Not Leave Innovation
Behind, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 328, 344-47 (2009) ("Reduced patent
quality is symptomatic of an overworked USPTO .... " Claims that too many "low
quality patents issue in the United States" and they "rarely are accompanied by any
objective parameters about what constitutes a low quality patent, or metrics
demonstrating an increase in the issuance of low quality patents").
15 PuB. L. NO. 112-29.
16 Consilvio & Stroud, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. at 43-45. See generally Robert A.
Armitage, Understandingthe America Invents Act andIts Implications forPatenting,
40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 9 (2012) (for a more in-depth examination of the history of patent
law reform).
17 Consilivo & Stroud, supranote 4, at
43-44.
18 Lorang supranote 10, at 3-8.
19 Id.
Id. (One of the action papers arising from the strategic plan, "Post-Grant
Review of Patent Claims," suggested that '[t]he patent laws should be amended to
provide for a post-grant review of patentability of patent claims.").
20

21

22

Id.
Id.

Id.; see also William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of A FastMoving Target: The Development of PatentLaw Since the 2004 NationalAcademies
Report, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 153, 196 (2009) ("The National
Academies report introduced the idea of an open review of issued patents to improve
the quality of patents in a way more efficient than litigation or existing reexamination
23

8
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Trade Commission (ITC) also argued for a post-grant review
mechanism in the United States as a way to produce better patents
and avoid costly litigation.24
None of these proposals, nor the 2006 or 2007 Congressional
proposals for post-grant review, included language similar to §
324(b),25 which permits the Director of the PTO to institute PGR to
resolve "novel or unsettled legal questions. 26 This part of the statute,
which is the main provision of concern discussed below,

27

was first

introduced in the Patent Reform Acts of 2008 and 2009, neither of
which became law.28 The § 324(b) provision was in the original bill as
introduced by Senator Leahy in 2011, however the congressional
record 29 of both the House and Senate is silent as to this provision; the
provision remained untouched between initial introduction with the
bill and eventual passage as the America Invents Act in 2011.30
B. Post-grantreview
Post-grant review is generally viewed as the PTO's most
powerful tool for invalidating patents. 31 Post-grant review was added
by section six of the AIA, which added Chapter 32 to title 35 of the
United States Code.3 2
The purpose of the new post-grant review proceedings
established by the AIA is to provide a cost-effective alternative to
litigation for patent validity challenges. 33 Post-grant review (PGR) is

proceedings... recommend[ing] 'an Open Review procedure...'").
24 Katharine M. Zandy, Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right? A Goldilocks
Approach to PatentReexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 865, 883-

85 (2006).
25 35 U.S.C. §324(b) (2012).
26
27
28
29

Id.

Lorang supranote 10, at 8-9.

Id.
See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative Historyof the America Invents Act:

PartII of I, 21 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 539, 599-605 (2012) (For an in-depth review of the
legislative history of the America Invents Act, specifically with respect to the history
of post-grant review).
0 Lorang supranote 10, at 8-9.
31 Sarah Tran, PatentPowers,25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609,
631-33 (2012).
32 Hung H. Bui, Esq., An Overview ofPatent Reform Act
of 2011: Navigating the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act IncludingEffective Datesfor PatentReform, 93 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 441,460-61 (2011).
33 William Hannah, Major Change, New Chapter: How
Inter PartesReview and
Post Grant Review Proceedings Created by the America Invents Act Will Shape
Litigation Strategies, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 27, 32 (2012); Robert L. Stoll,
MaintainingPost-GrantReview Estoppel in the America Invents Act Revisited: A
CallforLegislativeRestraint,23 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 15,15-19 (2013).
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an adversarial and trial-like post-grant opposition procedure available
to any party other than the patentee.34 The petition must be filed
within nine months of the patent grant or reissue date.35 The filing fee
is $35,000, and each additional claim costs $800.36 The entire
proceeding, including discovery, is estimated to cost between $175,000
and $338,000. 37 The petition must identify "each claim challenged, the

grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
claim. 3 8
evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each
The patent owner has a right to file a preliminary response after a
petition is filed in which the owner argues why PGR should not be
instituted. 39 The decision of whether to authorize PGR then rests with
41
the PTO Director,40 and her decision is final and non-appealable.

The director may only authorize PGR under either § 324 (a) or
(b). 4 2 The Director may authorize PGR under § 324(a) if the Director
is able to determine that the information contained within the
petition, if not rebutted, demonstrates that it is more likely than not
that at least one of the claims in the challenged patent is patentable.4 3
The Director may authorize PGR under § 324(b), "Additional
Grounds," if there is a showing "that the petition raises a novel or
unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent
applications."
The scope of PGR is broader than other challenge proceedings
under the AIA.44 Ex parte reexamination, which remains in force
from the old patent system in the U.S., allows any third party to
challenge a patent, at any time, for prior art consisting of patents or
printed publications or statements of the patent owner in federal court
34 Lawrence B. Ebert, Comment on "PatentGrant Rates at the United States
Patentand Trademark Office" 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3-4 (2005) (PGR has

been available for covered business method patents since September 16, 2012); see
also Arjun Rangarajan, TowardsA More Uniform Procedurefor PatentInvalidation,
95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.Soc'Y 375, 378 (2013).
35 Ebert supra note 34, at 3-4 (PGR of a CBM may only be filed by a party, party
in interest, or privy of the party, that has been sued for or charged with infringement
of the patent, but may be filed at any time after the CBM patent grant, for as long as
the business method review procedure remains in effect.); see also William Hannah
supra note 33, at 36-37.
6 Hannah supranote 33, at 33.
37 Id. at 41.
38 Lorang supra note 10, at 3-8.
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 Id.
42

Id.

43 Id.
44 Hannah supra note 33, at 36-37.
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regarding claim scope that create substantial new questions of
patentability. 45 Inter partes review, which phases out parent inter
partesreexamination, allows any person to challenge the validity of an
issued patent based on novelty or obviousness on the basis of prior art
consisting of patents or printed publications.46 Importantly, both of
these challenges are limited to either prior art or statements in federal
court concerning claim scope.47
PGR, on the other hand, can be instituted for any ground of
invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) or (3),48 including novelty,
obviousness, utility, indefiniteness, written description, enablement,
and, most importantly for the scope of this note, patentable subject
matter. 49 The petitioner must show that it is "more likely than not
that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable" 50 or that the
petition raises a "novel or unsettled legal question that is important to
other patents.",51 52
The standard of review for PGR is a "preponderance
of the evidence. ,

Importantly, PGR is only available to those patents filed under
the new first-to-file provisions of the AIA.5 3 This means that, in
general, only those patents with an effective filing date on or after
March 16, 2013, will be eligible for post grant review.54
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), which replaces the
Board of Patent Appeal and Interferences, 55 is comprised of three
administrative patent judges appointed by the secretary of
commerce,56 and is required under the AIA 57 to complete its review of
a PGR petition and decide on patent validity within one year of the
institution of the proceeding. 58 This is intended to be a significant
improvement over prior post-grant review procedures, including
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 301(a)(1)-(2) (2012); see also 35 USC § 302
(2012).

46 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012); see also Bui supranote 32, at 459.
47 Id.
48 24 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)-(3) (2012).
49 Ebert supra note 34, at 3-4 (PGR cannot be based on
inventorship,
unenforceability, inequitable conduct or best mode issues); Hannah supranote 33, at
36-37; Stoll supra note 33, at 15-19 (2013).
50 Ebert supranote 34, at 3-4; 35 USC § 324 (2012).
51 Bui supra note 32, at 460-61.
52

Id.

53 Stoll supranote 33, at 15-19.
54 Id. (This is especially interesting for biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents,

which generally take longer to issue. A large upswing in PGR is likely on the
horizon.).
5S Hannah supra note 33, at 38.
56 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
57 Pub. L. No. 211-12.
58 Ebert supra note 34, at 4.
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reexaminations, which took anywhere from one to five years to
complete.5 9
Finally, discovery is significantly broadened in PGR under the
AIA.The broadened discovery should give an accused infringer a
60
greater ability to invalidate claims in view of the prior art.
C. Power of the PTO
The PTO has the power to make rules, including questions of
"substantive patent law., 61 The PTO may issue regulations governing
the conduct of the office, screen patent applications, address
62 The
patentability questions, and interpret statutory and civil law.
PTO's new responsibilities over PGR leave an institutional structure
PTO considerable discretion to implement and set
that permits the
63
policy.
patent
The AIA's new post-grant mechanisms give the PTO power to
"develop presumptively binding interpretations of substantive patent
law" through adjudicatory proceedings. 64 The AIA requires that PGR
take place in an adversarial, court-like proceeding before the PTAB,
argument. 65
where the parties are each entitled to discovery and oral
Importantly, the AIA is silent as to the deference owed to the
PTO's legal determinations announced during PGR.6 6 This raises
serious questions about whether Congress intended for the PTO,
which already has sole authority to adjudicate the validity of patent
67
applications, to have interpretive authority over the Patent Act.
Some scholars argue that Congress did in fact intend for the PTO to
have interpretive authority over the Act because Congress intended
6 8 and
the PTO to effectuate PGR through formal adjudication,
because this grant of formal adjudicatory power accompanied a

Id. (This long period was cited by district courts and the ITC alike as a reason
not to stay proceedings during PTO reexam).
60 Hannah supra note 33, at 41-42 ("If more prior art and testimony are
considered when meeting a lower burden, then logically it is more likely to find claims
not novel or obvious").
61 John M. Golden,
The U.S.P.T.O.'s Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron
Deference?,66 SMU L. REV. 541, 543-46 (2013).
59

62

Id.

63 Tran supra note 31, 631-33.
64 Golden supra note 61, at 543-46.
65 Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1976-77 (2013).
66 Id.
67

Id.

68

Id.
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69
delegation of interpretive authority.
Administrative authority is an ongoing and evolving question in
2015.70 In June, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision
on healthcare in King v. Burwell.71 Referencing the two-step Chevron
framework, the Court noted that this approach is "premised on the
theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation
from Congress to the agency to fill the statutory gaps., 72 The Court in
King, however, refined this view to mean that a statute's ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill
the statutory gaps, provided such a "filling" comports with the overall
73
plan of the legislation.
Importantly, unlike the pre-AIA reexamination proceedings,
PGR permits challenges before the PTAB on any grounds of
patentability.74 This permits challengers under PGR to raise broad
legal and policy issues outside of novelty and obviousness.75
Accordingly, the statutory language of the AIA including the
expansion in statutory basis for challenging bad patents supports the
argument that Congress viewed PGR as a "law-making vehicle" by
which the PTO could announce legal and policy determinations that
could affect the rights of many for long periods of time. 6

II. PTO POWER TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATIER DOES NOT CREATE LONG-TERM SECURITY FOR
INVESTMENT

The PTO's power to determine what constitutes patentable
subject matter may not create long-term security for those wishing to
Id.
King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015); see also Daniel Fisher, Did
a
judge just kick off the great unraveling of the administrativestate with SEC ruling?,
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/06/09/did-a-judge-just-kickoff-the-great-unraveling-of-the-administrative-state-with-sec-ruling/
[http://perma.cc/Y55D-TK8Y]; Hill v. S.E.C., No. 1:15-CV-1801-LMM, 2015 WL
4307088, at *9 (N.D. Ga. June 8, 2015); E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation,L.P.,
134 S.Ct. 1584, 1610, 188 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2014) (Scalia, J.,concurring).
71 King, 135 S.Ct. at 2488-89.
72 Id. citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159, 120
S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000).
73 King, 135 S.Ct. at 2496 ("In a democracy, the power to make the law rests
with
those chosen by the people. Our role is more confined- 'to say what the law is.' ...
But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to
undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of
the legislative plan.")
74 Wasserman supra note 65, at 1976-77.
75 Id.
76 King, 135 S.Ct. at 2496.
69

70
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invest in patent protection because as technology develops at a
quicker pace, what is "patentable subject matter" may be subject to
rapid changes over time as popular opinions change.
A patent is intended to be a means to the end of innovation.77
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the ability to give inventors an
exclusive right to their discoveries for a limited time.78 This monopoly
is intended to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.7 9
The concept of providing monopolies to create incentive structures to
innovate is not a novel one:80 The Venetians offered exclusive rights
to inventors and entrepreneurs that brought new technologies to
Venice in 1474 in order to incentivize skilled artisans to come to
Venice. 81 This model was copied by other European countries to
stimulate innovation and promote economic development.8 2 Britain's
Statute of Monopolies, which offered legal property rights in ideas,
83
played a critical role in encouraging Britain's Industrial Revolution.
The United States created the first modern patent system, which was,
and remains instrumental in encouraging technological progress and
economic growth in the United States.8 4
Stronger patents induce investment in research and
development8 5 and promote innovation and economic growth8 6 by
securing to inventors exclusive rights to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
what they invent for a period of time.87 Both positive political theory
and simple intuition help to explain why: Individuals are rational,
opportunistic, and operate in uncertain economic and strategic
Accordingly, economic actors pursue investment
environments. 8

77 Robert Reis, Smoke and Mirrors:America Invents Act 2011: A Chill in the
Air?, 6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 301, 304 (2012).
78 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8 cl. 8.
79 Id.
80 See Petra Moser, PatentsandInnovation: Evidencefrom EconomicHistory,27
J. ECON. PERSP. 1, 23-44,25 (2012).
81
82

Id.

Id.

Id.
84 Id.
85 See generally William D. Nordhaus, Theory of Innovation: An Economic
Theory of TechnologicalChange,59 AM. ECON. REV. 2 18-28 (1969).
86 Khan, B. Zorina, & Kenneth L. Sokoloff. "Schemes of practical utility":
entrepreneurshipandinnovation among "greatinventors"in the United States, 17901865",53 J. ECON.His. 2, 289-307 (1993).
87 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
88 Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public
Bureaucracy,in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT
83

AND BEYOND,

115-150, 122 (1990).
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vehicles that separate "politics from administration. 89
The
foundation of economic organization is that actors can focus on
putting their property to its most efficient uses because a legal
framework that guarantees property rights now can be reasonably
assumed to exist in the future. 90 Politics, however, lacks this
foundation. 91 Preferred policy choices change as often as popular
opinion changes. 92 Accordingly, it is desirable for investors to
separate politics and popular opinion from their long-term investment
vehicles, such as patents.
Levy and Spiller demonstrate this concept by using transaction
cost economics to analyze what makes privatized utilities succeed in
different political and social circumstances.9 3 The authors examine,
specifically, the success of telecommunications utilities in Argentina,
Chile, Jamaica, the Philippines and the United Kingdom to determine
how political institutions interact with regulatory processes and
economic conditions.9 4
The authors determined that economic
performance, in any geographic region, could be satisfactory as long
as arbitrary administrative action could be restrained.9 5 Specifically,
the ability of an agency framework to facilitate investment is
dependent on its credibility and effectiveness. 96 Credibility and
effectiveness of a framework can produce satisfactory economic
performance when (a) there are substantive restraints on the
discretion of the agency; (b) formal or informal constraints are placed
on changing the agency's system; and (c) there are institutions that
enforce the above formal substantive and procedural constraints.97
Without a commitment to these three factors, long-term investment
and economic growth do not take place.98
Similarly, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that a fear of rapid
changes in popular opinion also motivated the design of the United
States Constitution, as the framers sought a separation of powers and
a procedure for generating legislation that would change only

89

Id. at 125.

90

See id.

91

Id.

9

See id.

Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, Institutional Foundations of Regulatory
Commitment: A ComparativeAnalysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L.,
ECON. & ORG. 201-246 (1994).
9 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 202.
9 Id.
98

Id.
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incrementally over time, avoiding large shifts. First, the framers of the
Constitution created a legislative process whereby most social and
economic problems would not generate legislation.9 9 Second, the
framers intended that if a social or economic problem did in fact
generate legislation, shifts away from the status quo would be
moderate, rather than radical.'0' Third, the framers intended that
once legislation was enacted into law, it would progressively be
the course of time to reflect the original intended
interpreted over
01
policy balance.'
Accordingly, the design of lawmaking in Article I, Section 7 of
the Constitution of a bicameral presidential lawmaking model was
desired by the framers because of their rejection of lawmaking by
simple majority votes. 10 2 Leaving long-reaching policy up to simple
majority votes was viewed as dangerous by the framers because
temporary alliances, desires, and voter preferences could result 1in
interest. 0 3
short-sighted policies not in line with the long-term public
The model we use today is representative of the framers' desires to
balance republican liberty with long-term stability. 1' 4 Popular and
perhaps temporary preference should play a role in the legislative
not play such a large role that it creates
process, however it should
10 5
short-sighted policies.
Positive political theory shows that institutional security for
long-term investment can be created a number of ways. Most
importantly, whatever specific mechanisms are used, the target for
creating security for investment is to separate the investment vehicle,
in this case patent protection, from the changing tide of popular
opinion. There is a significant question whether the new PGR process
under the AIA, which permits the PTAB to make legal decisions on
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 532
(1992); see alsoU.S. CONST. art. I, §. 7.
100 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Article 1, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 532
(1992).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 528. Eskridge and Ferejohn have modeled the Constitution's
requirements for lawmaking into a sequential game. The start of the game is the
status quo. In our bicameral presidential system, under Article I, Section 7, we only
get a new law when one of two things happen. First, a law is passed if the median
legislator in both chambers and the President all agree that the status quo should be
changed to a particular new law. Second, a law will be passed if two-thirds of the
members of each chamber agree that the status quo should be changed to a particular
new law. Never is there a new law passed with a simple majority vote, which can occur
in parliamentary systems of government.
99

03
104

Id.
Id.

105 Id.
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the scope of patentable subject matter, appropriately shields the law
10 6
from the changing views of the public and patent bar.
III. 35 U.S.C. § 101 AND PGR
35 U.S.C. § 10107 requires that the subject matter of a patentable
new invention be a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
08
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that this statutory language
"specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries
that are eligible for protection: processes, machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter."'1 9 The Supreme Court has further
identified "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" as
patentable subject matter.'10
35 U.S.C. § 324(b), new under the patent law, maintains that a
patent can be challenged as invalid "on any ground ...as a condition
for patentability," including patent eligible subject matter, nonobviousness, and novelty, among others. Accordingly, a petitioner
may "argue that a patent does not cover patent eligible subject
grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the
evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.""'
There must be "a showing that the petition raises a novel or
unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent
applications." '" 2 The post-grant review, once authorized by the
director, is governed by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB),
which is comprised of the Director, Deputy Director, the
Commissioner of Patents, the Commissioner of Trademarks, and
administrative patent judges. 13 The administrative patent judges are

106 Members of the patent bar recognize that policy-based judicial decisions
are

bad for business. See Ariosa is a good example of outcome driven § 101 decisions,
available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/09/ariosa-is-a-good-example-ofoutcome-driven- c2 a7-101-decisions/id=60433/
[http://perma.cc/8NMJ-UKR4]
("Courts these days are making policy-based decisions, untethered from any rule of
law, aimed at killing patents they don't like and I am skeptical that any amount of
skill could have changed that in Ariosa (or in AMP, In re Roslin, UURF v. Ambry,
etch")
35 U.S.C. § 101.
108 Id.

109 Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review
of

Patents,17 UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2013 at 1, 10-11.
110 Id.

II Id. at 10-11.
112 Id.
113

Id.
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appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.'
What constitutes patentable subject matter is quite broad, but is
limited to processes, machines, manufacture, or compositions of
matter. 115 Abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature are
not eligible for patent protection because these principles represent
"the basic tools of scientific and technological work," and are "part of
the storehouse of knowledge' 16of all men . . . free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none." "
What constitutes patentable subject matter under § 101 has
evolved slowly over time, but always with the courts. 1 7 The law is
perpetually unsettled, and the pace of change is accelerating,
especially in biotechnology.' 18 The judiciary has recently produced 119a
matter,
slew of cases discussing what constitutes patentable subject
and the PTO has produced four sets of guidelines focused on subject
matter eligibility based on these cases.120 This has led to additional
challenges to subject-matter eligibility of biotechnology inventions
2
'
since Mayo, the first of these biotechnology cases, was decided.'
122
In In re Bilski, an en banc decision for the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit stated that the "machineor-transformation test" was the appropriate test for what constitutes

114

Id.

115 Melissa

F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2008 (2013).
116

Id.

117 Lorang, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Spring 2013, at 1, 10-11; see also the legal

questions in Bilski and Prometheus.
118 Id.; Kate Gaudry, Trends In Subject Matter Eligibility For Biotechnology
Inventions, available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/12/trends-in-subjectmatter-eligibility-for-biotechnology-inventions/id=59738/.
119Gaudry, Trends in Subject Matter Eligibility for Biotechnology Inventions,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/12/trends-in-subject-matteravailable at
eligibility-for-biotechnology-inventions/id=59738/ [http://perma.cc/LM4Z-5BYJ]; see
also Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. -, 132
S.Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
__ 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
120 Gaudry, Trends in Subject Matter Eligibility for Biotechnology Inventions,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/12/trends-in-subject-matterat
available
eligibility-for-biotechnology-inventions/id=59738/ [http://perma.cc/LM4Z-5BYJ].
21 Id. ("Across the 1630, 1640 1650 and 1670 biotechnology art units, the average
office-action count rose 25 from 2.0 in the January 2012 Pre-Mayo time period to 2.5
in the February 2015 After Interim Guidelines time period. Art unit group 1630,
which evaluates claims related to molecular biology and DNA, among other things,
shows the highest number of office actions before allowance than any other art unit
group shown.").
122 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008) aff'd but criticized sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).

18

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL

[Vol XI

patent-eligible subject matter.1 23 "The machine-or-transformation test
is a two-branched inquiry; an applicant may show that a process claim
satisfies § 101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a particular
machine, or by showing that his claim transforms an article. 1 24
In Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 125 the
Supreme Court decided in 2012 that a personalized medicine dosing
process was not eligible for protection because the process was
effectively an unpatentable law of nature. 26
Perhaps most
importantly, in Mayo the Supreme Court "set forth a framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of
those concepts. 1 27 The first step is to determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. 128 If so, the Court
will then consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as
an ordered combination" to determine whether additional elements
"transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-eligible
application. 129 The second step of this analysis is to search for an
"inventive concept," an element or combination of elements that is
"sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
130
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.',
Finally, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 31 the Supreme Court in a 9-0 decision overturning the
Federal Circuit, held that isolated natural DNA sequences containing
genes are not patentable subject matter.1 32 Important in Myriadis the
history of the case presented to the Supreme Court. The Federal
Circuit, in deciding that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible
subject matter afforded considerable deference to the PTO, citing the
123
124

125

Id.
Id.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294

(2012).

126 Id. ("We find that the process claims at issue here
do not satisfy these
conditions. In particular, the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural
laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field. At the same time, upholding the patents would
risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their
use in the making of further discoveries.").
127 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
128

Id.

129 Id.(citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1298).
130

131

(2013).
132

Id.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
Id.
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"longstanding practice of the PTO and the courts,,133 and that "the
PTO has issued patents relating to DNA molecules for almost thirty
years." 34 The Federal Circuit further deferred to the PTO's
conclusions that genes are patentable in the Journal of the Patent and
Trademark Office Society and the PTO's own Utility Examination
Guidelines to reach its own conclusion that genes were in fact
patentable. 135 This position was criticized by the Supreme Court,
which cited Congress's purported failure to endorse the views of the
PTO in legislation post-J.E.M. Ag Suppy' 36 and the United States'
own amicus argument that genes were not patentable and that "the
not 'a sufficient reason to hold that isolated DNA
PTO's practice was 37
is patent-eligible.""
Ariosa v. Sequenom' 38 is the most recent case concerning
patentable subject matter. In Ariosa, a test for determining fetal
abnormalities using prenatal DNA screening was determined to not
be patentable subject matter because "appending routine,
conventional steps to a natural phenomenon, specified at a high level
39 This
of generality, is not enough to supply an inventive concept."'
courts of "expanding
has led members of the patent bar to accuse the
140
States.,
United
the
in
innovation
their war on
35 U.S.C. § 324(b), which allows the PTAB to review novel
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff'd in part,rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013).
134 Id. at 1333.
133

135

Id.

136 J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 534 U.S. 124 (2001).

137 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2119
(2013) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae20-33).
138 Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1378.
139 Id.
Courts are making bad patent law, available at
140 Robert L. Stoll,

http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/248054-courts-are-making-badpatent-law#.VafCSf53psO.1inkedin [http://perma.cc/QYX3-2YW5] ("The courts' focus
on subject matter eligibility as a mechanism to deny patents for these inventions will
drive investment into research in these technologies to other areas. We will lose our
edge in the world and many further valuable contributions to science will not come to
fruition . .

.

. If the courts are unwilling to listen to the scientists and the patent

community as to the effects these positions have on innovation, perhaps it is time to
engage the legislators and the White House to clarify the law to ensure that we
continue to promote the useful sciences."); see also Ariosa is a Good Example of
at
available
Decisions,
101
§
Outcome-Driven
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/09/arisa-is-a-good-example-of-outcome-drivenc2 a7-101-decisions/id=60433/ [http://perma.cc/X6CY-EYRA] ("[] I perceive a
common thread running through these decisions ...supporting the growing feeling
amongst the innovation community that § 101 decisions have taken on an arbitrary,
outcome-driven quality").
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legal questions regarding what constitutes patentable subject matter,
is a clear break from pre-AIA practice, and gives considerable power
to the patent office to make legal determinations regarding the very
heart of patent law. This presents a concern for any person wishing to
pursue patent protection, from the perspective of institutional security
for long-term investment, especially in the life sciences and
biotechnology. The PTO has already tried to push patent policy such
that § 101 would encompass human genes as patentable subject
1 41
matter. Now, we live in a brave new world of synthetic biology,
which can reliably combine genetic pieces to produce consumer
products, including biofuels and cosmetics. 142 It is becoming more and
more difficult to determine what is "synthetic," and patentable, and
what is "natural," and not patentable, 4 3 and it is no secret that the
patent bar is actively pursuing an expansion of what constitutes
patentable subject matter. 144 As research is performed at a quicker
pace, and as the world of knowledge grows around us, and as the
break between natural and artificial begins to blur, serious questions
will be raised regarding what is a "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter" and is patentable, and what is a natural
process, and is not patentable. The judiciary is the best tool to
provide patent-seekers long-term security in investment.
There must be an active judiciary; there must be a threat of being
overturned on appeal in order to ensure that the PTO does not stray
far from its delegated authority, especially for what constitutes
patentable subject matter. How to do this is addressed in the next
section.
141

Jay Keasling, Why Synthetic Biology Is the Field of the Future, PBS NOVA

(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/why-synthetic-biology-is-thefield-of-the-future/ http://perma.cc/DYU6-3YHW].
142 Id.
143 Id.; see also Berthhold Rutz, Synthetic Biology and Patents,European Patent
Office (Nov. 11, 2009) http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6384/_draft/ru
rutz-slidesl.pdf [http://perma.cc/28FB-4B9C] (raising questions about artificial
codons, non-natural amino acids, and protocells); Luigi Palombi,, Beyond
Recombinant Technology: Synthetic Biology and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 J.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5, 371-401, 381 (2009).
144 Letter from Lisa Dunner, ABA IPL Section Chair, to Michelle Lee, Director
USPTO ("Alice, Myriad, and Mayo were narrow decisions, and the Office should
allow the courts to incrementally determine, over time, what should not be patenteligible subject matter, rather than attempting to affirmatively delineate the scope of
patent-eligible subject matter, thereby risking excluding whole classes of inventions,
including prospectively excluding deserving but yet-to-be discovered technology. The
Section fears that the Office may be improperly excluding from patent-eligibility
many important diagnostic, nature-based products, computer-implemented, software,
and/or business method inventions, which would otherwise allow many new
businesses to flourish.").
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CLOSE REVIEW OF PTAB DECISIONS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER CREATES SECURITY FOR
INVESTMENT IN PATENT PROTECTION

The best way to create security for long-term investment in
patent protection may be for the Federal Courts to act as a check on
PTAB decisions.
The Federal Circuit, as it is currently constructed, may not be an
effective check on the PTO. The Federal Circuit's overt specialization
in the patent law has led several commentators to suggest that the
Federal Circuit is prone to tunnel vision and bias with respect to
review of PTO decisions; 145 the patent bar is especially vocal towards
the Federal Circuit, 46 and the Court draws its staff, including clerks,
from patent-centric law firms. 147 The policy-driven PTO, rather than
the courts, is given primary interpretive authority over legalquestions
of core patentability standards, which is concerning over the longterm if the Federal Circuit does not serve as an effective check on
PTO decisions. 148
The Federal Circuit has been shown to be more likely to uphold
the PTO's determination of a patent's validity when compared with
the regional circuits that came before it. 149 Henry and Turner find
that the Federal Circuit has been pro-patent with respect to the PTO's
determinations of validity.' 50 Further, the Federal Circuit has been
reluctant to apply traditional administrative law principles when

145 Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deferencefor the PTO,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2015 (2013).
146 See generally Lawrence Baum, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES, 97-99 (2006)
(Judges serving on specialized courts are likely to orient themselves toward the
law Ters and legal fields in which they concentrate.").
Wasserman, supra note 145 at 2015 (2013) ("[T]he possibility that the Federal
Circuit's decision-making process is unduly influenced by factions, at the very least,
gives pause to dismissing the concept of the PTO playing a larger role in patent policy
based on agency capture alone"); see also Timonthy Lee, After a Scandal at
America's PatentCourt, It's Time for Reform, Vox Topics (May 27, 2014), available
http://www.vox.com/2014/5/27/5753866/the-real-problem-with-the-federal-circuit
at
[http://perma.cc/N4W7-ZTGC] (discussing Judges of the Federal Circuit seem to have
absorbed the pro-patent worldview of the lawyers who spend so much time practicing
in their courtroom. Federal Circuit judges and patent attorneys also see a lot of each
other outside the courtroom. Federal Circuit judges attend patent lawyers'
conferences, read patent lawyers' publications, and inevitably form friendly
relationships with members of the patent bar.).
148 Wasserman, supra note 145 at 1959.
149 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The FederalCircuitAs A FederalCourt,54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1791, 1854-55 (2013).
1s0Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit'sImpact on PatentLitigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114-15 (2006).
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151

reviewing PTO decisions.
In contrast to the Federal Circuit's treatment of other agencies,
the Federal Circuit views PTO policy decisions as encompassing fact
and law, or sometimes fact, law, and discretion. 152 Patentees are
estimated to be three times more likely to overcome a district court
1 53
finding of invalidity since the inception of the Federal Circuit.
Perhaps because of this, district courts have found patents to be
invalid about
half as often as before that inception of the Federal
154
Circuit.

The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Roberts, has recently
granted certiorari to many more cases appealed from the Federal
Circuit than it has in the past. 55 The Federal Circuit has seemingly
used its monopoly power over patent appeals to shift patent law
towards the favors of patent holders, rebuking the Supreme Court.156
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle,101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1666-67 (2007).
152 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the Apa? What the
PatentSystem Can Learn from AdministrativeLaw,95 GEO. L.J. 269, 305-08 (2007).
151

153

Id.

154

Id.

Timothy B. Lee, Obama Wants To Fix The PatentSystem. Here's a Crucial
Reform He Overlooked, Wash.
Post
(Jan 29, 2014),
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.co n/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/29/obama-wants-to fixthe-patent-system-heres-a-crucial-reform-he-overlooked/
[http://perma.cc/3UQDY8AR]; see also Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 45-46 (2012) citing In re Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010) (patentable subject matter); Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007) (standing to challenge a patent); KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007) (nonobviousness); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006) (injunctive relief); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193
(2005) (statutory research exemption); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (prosecution history estoppel) (Moreover, the
court has allowed the patent doctrine to become unmoored from the law's
overarching utilitarian purpose. In the last decade, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in an unprecedented number of Federal Circuit decisions. The Supreme
Court's uncharacteristic level of involvement in patent matters suggests that it too is
dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit's performance.).
156 Timothy B. Lee, Obama Wants To Fix The Patent
System. Here's a Crucial
Reform He Overlooked, Wash.
Post (Jan
29, 2014),
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/29/obama-wants-to-fixthe-patent-system-heres-a-crucial-reform-he-overlooked/
[http://perma.cc/3UQDY8AR]; see also Cheif Justice Roberts' comment on the Federal Circuit (June 3,
2009), available at http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the-prior art/2009/06/chief-justiceroberts-and-the-federal-circuit.html [http://perma.cc/PYC6-T4NX] (Chief Justice
Roberts: They can't say, I don't like the Supreme Court rule so I'm not going to apply
it, other than the Federal Circuit.); Timothy B. Lee, How a Rogue Appeals Court
Wrecked the Patent System: Federal Court of Appeals Court Marks 30 Years of
Spreading the "Patent Gospel" Ars Technica (Sept. 30, 2012), available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/how-a-rogue-appeals-court-wrecked-the155
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The Supreme Court has overruled patent-friendly decisions from the
Federal Circuit ten times in as many years, while only overruling a
Federal Circuit decision going against a patent holder or applicant
is cited more in pro-patent
once. 157 The Federal Circuit's precedent
158
opinions than in anti-patent opinions.
As of June, 2015, the Federal Circuit has yet to reverse a PTAB
decision. 159 Indeed, only one decision has been less than fully
affirmed. 160
patent-system/ [http://perma.cc/73L7-8UMZ (The Federal Circuit, he said, also took
on "the quieter and subtler effort to re-educate trial judges throughout the judiciary,
to make them friendlier to patent-holders (or at least to the system of patents) as
well." (Flanders, it should be noted, is an avowed supporterof the Federal Circuit and
its efforts to reshape patent law. This dismissive attitude toward Supreme Court
precedents apparently survives to this day among patent lawyers. In the wake of this
year's decision limiting patents on the practice of medicine, patent attorney Gene
Quinn wondered, "How long will it take the Federal Circuit to overrule this
inexplicable nonsense?" Obviously, the Federal Circuit can't "overrule" a Supreme
Court decision. But with enough persistence, it can, and often does, subvert the
principles enunciated by the nation's highest court. And when it does so, it almost
always works in the direction of making patents easier to obtain and enforce.).
157 Timothy B. Lee, Obama Wants To Fix The Patent System. Here's a Crucial
available at
Reform He Overlooked, Wash. Post (Jan 29, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/29/obamawants-to-fix[http://perma.cc/3UQDthe-patent-system-heres-a-crucial -reform-he -overlooked/
Y8AR]; see also Jeff J. Roberts, Supreme Court Rebukes Patent Court Judges
at
available
2014),
23,
(Jan
Research
Gigaom
(Again)
https://gigaom.com/2014/01/23/supreme-court-rebukes-patent-court-judges-again/
[htt://perma.cc/S36T-PCWK].
1
David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent
Precedent:An EmpiricalStudy of InstitutionalAuthority and Intellectual Property
Ideology,2012 Wis. L. REV. 1177, 1212-13 (2012).
159 See Softview LLC v. Kyocera Corp., 592 Fed.Appx. 949 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2015)
(IPR2013-00004) (joined); Softview LLC v. Kyocera Corp., 592 Fed.Appx. 949 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 9, 2015) (IPR2013-00257) (joined); Softview LLC v. Kyocera Corp., 592
Fed.Appx. 947 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2015) (IPR2013-00007) (joined); Softview LLC v.
Kyocera Corp., 592 Fed.Appx. 947 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2015) (IPR2013-00256) (joined);
Fed.
Board Of Trustees Of The University Of Illinois v. Micron Technology, Inc.,
Appx. - (Fed. Cir. March 12, 2015) (IPR2013-00005); Board Of Trustees Of The
University Of Illinois v. Micron Technology, Inc., Fed. Appx. - (Fed. Cir. March
12, 2015) (IPR2013-00006); Board Of Trustees Of The University Of Illinois v.
Micron Technology, Inc., -_Fed. Appx. - (Fed. Cir. March 12, 2015) (IPR201300008); Clearlamp, LLC v. LKQ Corp., 594 Fed.Appx. 687 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2015);
In re Zillow, Inc., -Fed. Appx. - (Fed. Cir. March 12, 2015); Helferich Patent
Licensing, LLC v. CBS Interactive, Inc., -Fed. Appx. - (Fed. Cir. April 8, 2015);
(Fed. Cir. June 5, 2015)
Bernina Int'l AG v. Handi Quilter, Inc., -Fed. Appx.
(IPR2013-00364); Prolitec, Inc. v. ScentAir Technologies, Inc., -Fed. Appx. - (Fed.
Cir. June 9, 2015) (IPR2013-00180); In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 2015 WL 1781484 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
17, 2015) (IPR2013-00058) (non-precedential); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 2015
WL 1781484 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 17, 2015) (IPR2013-00069) (non-precedential).
160 See Microsoft v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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If long-term investment security is preferred and wide shifts in
what constitutes patentable subject matter are to be avoided, a
sufficient check on PTO power is required. Nard and Duffy suggest
that the Federal Circuit and D.C. Circuit should each have jurisdiction
over PTO appeals, stating that "[t]he D.C. Circuit is the foremost
appellate authority on administrative law, and would thus bring an
61
experienced voice to administrative and regulatory law issues."'
Diversity and competition have been absent from patent law for
twenty years. 16262 This strips patent law of the 1 benefit
of incremental
63
advancements based on innovations in the law.
Judge Posner advocates going further by returning patent
appellate responsibility, in whole, to the regional circuits which had
jurisdiction prior to the inception of the Federal Circuit in 1982.164
This would comport with the position of Nard and Duffy, who believe
that, given the intricacy of patent law, the complexity of its
relationship to the goal of fostering innovation, and its importance for
the knowledge-based economy of the twenty-first century, our nation
needs a judicial structure that facilitates greater candor, open debate,
and thoughtfulness, and that better engages more judges, members of
the bar, commentators, and policymakers in evaluating the soundness
of legal doctrine in the area [and that] peer dialogue between
165
appellate courts is a traditional vehicle for achieving such goals.
Judge Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge for the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, shares this position. 166 The other appellate Courts are
comfortable working with other intellectual property regimes,
including copyright and trademark, as well as trade secret. 167 There is
68
a great value in obtaining the views of a number of judges.'
161

Id.

162 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's
Uniformity

Principle,101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1619, 1675 (2007).
163 Id. (stating Nard and Duffy explain that peer dialogue would be especially
helpful in the development of claim interpretation, nonobviousness, and written
description).
164 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the FederalCircuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
350, 350-51 (2014).
165 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's
Uniformity
Principle,101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1655 (2007); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The
FederalCircuitAs A FederalCourt,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1854 (2013) ("A
regional circuit, which lacks exclusive jurisdiction, would find it more difficult to
increase its own importance to a particular area of law.")
166 See Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the
Federal
Circuit's Exclusive Jurisdictionin Patent Cases? 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.PROP. 1, 6
(2013) (The same basic policies animate all of our Intellectual property regimes.).
167

168

Id.

Id. at 7-8.
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Although the technology may be complicated in a given case, the legal
issues are relatively straightforward. 6 9 Judge Wood proposes using a
system similar to that used to review decisions of the National Labor
Relations Board, where parties have a choice of forum to which they
may appeal decisions of the NLRB. 7 °
A model of "polycentric decision-making" among the circuits is
desirable for ensuring that the PTO stays within its bounds in setting
the law for what constitutes patentable subject matter. A polycentric
model (1) allows for a more robust and efficient development of the
common law; 171 (2) permits increased confidence and legitimacy in 172a
issue;
decision of law if multiple circuits decide the same way on an
(3) prohibits large national swings in the law over time as the
remaining circuits will not be bound by the decision of another circuit
concerning the patent law; (4) will introduce competitive pressure on
all participating circuit courts to express more complete and
thoughtful rationales; 173 and (5) improves judicial174candor by avoiding
excessive reliance on the precedent of one circuit.
Most importantly, it distances the appeals process away from a
seemingly pro-patent Federal Circuit. With this understanding, and
not wanting to be overturned, PTAB will presumably not make rapid
changes regarding what constitutes patentable subject matter, and will
These gradual
instead make gradual incremental changes.
will
patent-seekers
as
all,
of
benefit
the
to
be
incremental changes will
have a realistic expectation that what constitutes patentable subject
matter when they apply for patent will be what constitutes patentable
subject matter at the end of their patent term. This security will
incentive invention, which will serve patent law's constitutional
Id.
Id. at 9-10. ("Such a regime would have a number of advantages. Many of the
benefits that accrue from specialization will remain. It is possible-maybe even
likely-that the Federal Circuit would still play a leading role in shaping patent law.
Its opinions would be closely watched by regional circuits, just as the D.C. Circuit
exercises leadership in various aspects of administrative law because it hears so many
such cases. The absolute number of patent cases that would return to the regional
courts would not be large; there is, thus, no reason to expect that this change would
have much of an effect on time to disposition. But, on the positive side, the change
would provide those "wide open spaces" for development of patent law, allowing new
ideas to percolate and grow. The Supreme Court would also have the benefit of fuller
development in the lower courts and, thus, more information about which cases
warrant one of the scarce slots in its annual docket.")
171 Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle,101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1651-52 (2007).
172 Id. at 1653-54.
173 Id. at 1654.
169

170

174

Id.
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purpose of the promotion of Science and the useful arts.
V. CONCLUSION

This note argues that (1) the new post-grant review proceeding
gives the PTO a considerable amount of power to determine what
constitutes patentable subject matter; (2) the PTO's power to
determine what constitutes patentable subject matter does not create
long-term security in what patentable subject matter is; and (3) the
best way to create security for long-term investment in patent
protection is for the Court of Appeals to take a more active,
policymaking role in their review of PTAB decisions.
The (1) new post-grant review proceeding gives the PTO a
considerable amount of power to determine what constitutes
patentable subject matter because it permits the PTAB to decide
novel legal questions about any question of patentability, including
patentable subject matter.
The (2) PTO's power to determine what constitutes patentable
subject matter does not create long-term security in what patentable
subject matter because it is subject to rapid changes over time as
popular opinions change.
The (3) best way to create security for long-term investment in
patent protection is for the Courts of Appeals to take a more active
and policymaking role in their review of PTAB decisions to keep the
PTABs decisions in check. If the PTAB understands that their
decision to change what patentable subject matter is in too large of a
manner will be overturned, the PTAB will not change it past that
point. Because there is concern that the Federal Circuit is overly
deferential to the PTO and the decisions of the PTAB, there is also a
concern that the PTAB does not consider that check in its
decisionmaking process. To recreate the check, this note argues that
appeals from PTAB should be available in any Circuit Court in the
United States. Understanding that their decision could be reviewed
by any Circuit Court, and not necessarily the patent-friendly Federal
Circuit, will keep the PTAB from radically shifting what patentable
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subject matter is over the course of time. Rather, over time small
incremental changes will be made. Small, incremental changes create
the type of institutional security that induces investment in
innovation, new businesses, and additional research.

